Introduction
Theresearchofinformationeconomicshastwomainlinesfromthebeginning.
Oneisthemacro-informationeconomicswithFritzMachlupandMacUriPoratasthefounders.
Macroinformationeconomicsisalsocalledinformationeconomicsandinformationindustryeconomics.Focusingontheresearchofinformationindustryandinformationeconomy,itisanemergingdisciplinethatstudiesthevalueproduction,circulationandutilizationofinformation,aspecialcommodity,andeconomicbenefits.Itisdevelopedandestablishedonthebasisofthecontinuousdevelopmentofinformationtechnologyandisanimportantfieldofeconomics.
ThesecondisWesternInformationEconomicsandMicroInformationEconomicswithStiglerandArrowastheearliestresearchers.
Micro-informationeconomics,alsoknownastheoreticalinformationeconomics,startsfromamicroperspective,studiesthecostandpriceofinformation,andproposestouseincompleteinformationtheorytomodifythecompleteandcompleteinformationinthetraditionalmarketmodel.Knownassumptions.Focusonthevariousmechanismsforusinginformationtoimprovetheefficiencyofthemarketeconomy.Becauseitmainlystudieshowtoformulatecontracts,contracts,andthenormsoftheparties’behaviorinthecaseofasymmetricinformation,itisalsocalledcontracttheoryormechanismdesigntheory.
Formationanddevelopment
TheearliestresearcherinmacroinformationeconomicswasProfessorF.Machlup(F.Machlup)ofPrincetonUniversityintheUnitedStates.Hepublishedamonographin1962:"TheProductionandDistributionofKnowledgeintheUnitedStates",whichraisedtheissueoftheknowledgeindustryandmadeastatisticalmeasurementoftheproductionoftheknowledgeindustryintheUnitedStatesin1958.ThebookwastranslatedintoRussianin1966andthenintoJapanesein1968.Since1980,Machluphasexpandedhispreviousbookandsuccessivelypublishedan8-volumemasterpiece"Knowledge:ItsProduction,Distribution,andEconomicSignificance."Thefirstvolumeiscalled"KnowledgeandKnowledgeProduction".Thesecondwell-knownearlyresearcherisDr.MacUriPoratofStanfordUniversity.Inhisbook,heupdatedthestatisticsoftheknowledgeindustryintheUnitedStates.BasedonMachlup'sresearchandundertheinfluenceofDanielBell,hecompletedthe9-volumeinternalreportof"TheInformationEconomy"in1977.Thisreportwaswrittenonthebasisofhisdoctoraldissertation"AnalysisoftheInformationEconomyintheUnitedStates".Forthefirsttime,Poratdividedtheindustryintoagriculture,industry,serviceindustry,andinformationindustry,anddividedtheinformationdepartmentintothefirstinformationdepartmentandthesecondinformationdepartment.Thefirstinformationdepartmentisadepartmentcomposedofcompaniesthatprovideinformationproductsandinformationservicestothemarket,andthesecondinformationdepartmentisadepartmentcomposedofgovernmentandnon-informationcompanies’internalactivitiestoprovideinformationservices.Poratalsousedinput-outputtechnologytoperformadetailedstatisticalcalculationandquantitativeanalysisofthesizeandstructureoftheU.S.informationeconomyin1967accordingtoanothervalue-addedmethodthatisdifferentfromMarkloop'sfinaldemandmethod.ThismethodnotonlyattractedtheattentionoftheUSDepartmentofCommerce,butwasalsoadoptedbytheOrganizationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment(OECD)in1981tomeasurethedegreeofdevelopmentoftheinformationeconomyofitsmembercountries.
Micro-informationeconomicsstartedinthe1950s,formedinthe1960s,anddevelopedinthe1970sand1980s.ThefirsttostudyinformationfromaneconomicperspectivewereAmericaneconomistsStiglitzandJapan’sMiyazawa.Asearlyas1961,GeorgeStigler,anAmericaneconomistandoneofthefoundersofinformationeconomics,publishedapaperentitled"InformationEconomics"inthe"PoliticalValueanditsimpactonprices,wagesandotherfactorsofproductionhavebeenstudied.Itisbelievedthatobtaininginformationrequiresacost,andincompleteinformationwillleadtounreasonableallocationofresources.ProfessorVickeryintheUnitedStatesandProfessorMillisintheUnitedKingdomhavealsoextendedtheprincipal-agenttheoryunderthepremiseofasymmetricinformation.Theycallthepartywhohasmoreinformationastheagentandtheotherastheprincipal.Byintroducingconceptssuchas"incentivecompatibility",theproblemofasymmetricinformationistransformedintoaproblemofinstitutionalarrangementsandmechanismdesign.Theproposalofthistheoryishighlyvalued,andtherestraint-incentivemechanismisbeingwidelyused.TheUnitedStatesmainlystudiesthecostandvalueofrelevantinformationfromspecificapplications,andtheimpactofinformationonprices,wagesandotherproductionfactors;Japanfocusesonabstractresearchonthebasicprinciplesandmethodsofinformationsystemevaluation.Botharethetheoreticalbasisofinformationeconomics.Sincethe1970s,Horowitz’s"InformationEconomics",Japan’sMasudaYoneji’s"InformationEconomics",andAmericanHawken’s"NextGenerationEconomy"havebeenpublishedsuccessively.
The1996NobelPrizeinEconomicswasawardedtoProfessorJamesMorrisoftheUniversityofCambridgeintheUnitedKingdomandProfessorWilliamVickeryoftheUniversityofColumbiaintheUnitedStatesinrecognitionoftheircontributionstothestudyofWesternInformationEconomics.The2001NobelPrizeinEconomicswasawardedtothreeAmericaneconomists:JosephStiglitz,GeorgeAkerlov,andMichaelSpences,justtocommendthemfortheirachievementssincethe1970s.Theinitialimportantcontributionto"useasymmetricinformationformarketanalysis".AccordingtoapressannouncementissuedbytheRoyalSwedishAcademyofSciences,Akerlov’scontributionliesinhisclarificationofthefactthattheexistenceofsuchphenomenaassellersbeingabletoselllow-qualitygoodstobuyersisduetotheasymmetryofinformationheldbybothpartiesinthemarket..Informationimbalancemayevenmakepoor-qualitysecond-handcarscrowdoutthehigh-qualitycarmarket.Spencerevealshowpeopleshouldusethemoreinformationtheyhavetoachievegreaterbenefits.Stiglitzprovidedrelevanttheoriesformarketpartieswithlessinformationonhowtomakemarketadjustments.Theanalyticaltheoriesofthethreeprofessorshaveawiderangeofuses,notonlyfortheanalysisandresearchofthetraditionalagriculturalmarket,butalsofortheanalysisandresearchofthemodernfinancialmarket.Atthesametime,theirtheoriesconstitutethecoreofmoderninformationeconomics.
Researchcontent
[Introduction]
Informationeconomicsisasub-disciplineofinformationscience,itisaresearchoninformationThescienceofeconomicphenomenaandthecharacteristicsoftheirmovementchanges.Themainresearchcontentsinclude:
1.Theeconomicroleofinformation.Mainlystudytheeconomicattributesofinformationanditsroleineconomicdevelopment;thestatusandfunctionoftheinformationindustryinthenationaleconomy;theimpactofthedevelopmentandperfectionofinformationtechnologyonthesocialeconomy;thescale,structure,andorganizationofinformationandsocialproductionRelationship;theapplicationprocessandfunctionoftheinformationeconomymodelintheeconomicstructure,etc.
2.Thecostandvalueofinformation.Mainlystudythequalitativeandquantitativedescriptionofinformationvalue;therelationshipbetweeninformationvalueandcost;themanifestationofinformationvalue;themeasurementstandardsandcalculationmethodsofinformationvalue,etc.
3.Theeconomiceffectofinformation.Themainresearchistheratiooftheusevalueofinformationtotheamountoflaborconsumption;thecalculationandassessmentoftheeconomicbenefitsofinformation;thebestinvestmentandinvestmenteffectofinformationworkinsocialproduction;thenaturalandsocialfactorsthataffecttheeffectofinformationeconomy;improvetheeffectofinformationeconomyWaysandmethods,etc.
4.Informationindustrystructure.Mainlyresearchtheinformationindustrystructureanditsdevelopmentlawsandtrends;therelationshipbetweentheinformationindustryandthesectoraleconomicstructure,serviceindustrystructure,andeducationalinstitutions;theimpactoftheinformationindustrystructureontheemploymentstructure;theinformationandnon-informationfactorsofthechangeinthenationaleconomicstructureAnalysisetc.
5.Informationsystem.Includinghowtoestablishanddevelopacompleteinformationsystem;theimpactoftheaggregationanddispersionofinformationsystemsonthevalueofinformationsystems;theevaluationcriteriaandmethodsofinformationsystemsfromaneconomicperspective;theeconomicandsocialbenefitsofinformationsystemsandtheirinterrelationships;informationsystemsEconomicmanagement;selectionofoptimizedinformationsystems,etc.
6.Informationtechnology.Usetechnicalandeconomicprinciplestostudytheroleofinformationtechnologyinimprovinginformationeconomicbenefits;comparetheapplicationofvariousinformationtechnologies,andproposethebestplanforadoptingnewinformationtechnology;understandthecharacteristicsandlawsofthedevelopmentofinformationtechnology.
7.Informationeconomytheory.Includingthestudyofbasicissuessuchastheobject,content,nature,method,function,andhistoryofinformationeconomics.
[AsymmetricInformationEnvironmentandMicro-informationEconomics]
AsymmetricInformationBothpartiestothetransactioneachhaveprivateinformationrelatedtothetransactionthatothersdonotknow.
Inthe"Prisoner’sDilemma",theprisonersdonotknoweachother'schoice,sotheychoosetoconfess;thefamous"lemonmarket(inferiorproductmarket)"intheproductmarket,thesellerhasmorethanthebuyer.Alotofinformationaboutproducts;inthelabormarket,therearewages,incentives,andadverseselectionissues.Thebossdoesnotknowwhoofthemanysubordinatesismostcapableofbeingamanager.Idon’tknowwhetherthepreviousmanagercandevoteallhisenergytowork,andthesubordinatesdon’tknowhowmuchtheboss’sprofitis;thereisalsothebreedingandpunishmentofcorruption;themanagementoffalseadvertisementsandcounterfeitgoods,etc.,thereareinformationasymmetries.Theproblem.Informationeconomicsreferstothepartywhoownsprivateinformationasanagent.Thepartywhodoesnotknowthisinformationiscalledtheprincipal.Therefore,thegeneralasymmetricinformationproblemcanbeattributedtothe"principle-agent"model.Inanasymmetricinformationenvironment.Theconditionfortheestablishmentofthe"principle-agent"relationshipisthattheprincipal'spaymenttotheagentisnotlowerthanthelatter'sopportunitycostofparticipatinginthiscontract,whileatthesametimemaximizingitsownprofits.Underthisconditionofparticipationconstraintandincentivecompatibilityconstraint,whatshouldbethebestchoicefortheprincipal?GametheoryscholarHasanihasdoneanin-depthstudyonthisanddefinedtheBayes-Nashequilibrium,inordertofindthebestcontractorinstitutionalarrangement,sothattheagentcanconfidethetruth.Theclientcanalsoobtaininformationthroughsomesignals,suchasprices,honors,andadvertisements.Theasymmetricinformationenvironmentisoneoftheimportantestablishedconditionsofmicro-informationeconomics.Theperfectcompetitionmodelofmicroeconomicsisdifficulttoreallyexistinreality.Theresearchonthemarketunderthestateofincompleteinformationhasgraduallydevelopedintomicro-informationeconomics.Intheearly1990s,ChinagraduallybegantointroducetheachievementsofWesternmicro-informationeconomicsinthe1960sand1970s.WiththedevelopmentofChina'seconomictheoryandpractice,itattractedacertainamountofattention.In1996,theNobelPrizeinEconomicsawardedtwoinformationAftertheresearchersofeconomics,moreandmoreattentionhasbeenpaidtotheresearchofinformationeconomicsinChina,andtheintroduction,researchandapplicationofpapersandworkshavegraduallyincreased.
[MacroInformationEconomics]
MarkloopandStanfordofPrincetonUniversityThemacroinformationeconomicscreatedbyPorteroftheUniversityregardstheinformationindustryasthefourthindustryinagriculture,industry,andserviceindustries.Itusesstatisticsandquantitativeanalysistoillustratethedevelopmentoftheinformationeconomy.Itisthedevelopmentoftheinformationindustryandtheinformationeconomy.Theinevitablerequirementandtheinevitableresult.InformationeconomistsrepresentedbyWuJiapeibelievethatthemainresearchcontentofmacro-informationeconomicsis:
Theemergenceanddevelopmentoftheinformationindustry,anditsstatusandroleinthenationaleconomy:issuesrelatedtotheinformationmarket,Suchasthecalculationofthevalueandpriceofinformationcommodities,theexaminationofthebehaviorofmarketentitiesandtheexpansionofmarketcapacity;theresearchonthelawsofproduction,exchange,consumptionanddistributionofinformationcommoditiesandtheeffectiveallocationofinformationresources:
Theproblemofinformatizationofthenationaleconomyandhowtouseinformationtechnologytotransformtraditionalindustryandagriculture,aswellastheresearchofinformationsystemswithinformationtechnologyasthemainresearchobject.Generallyspeaking,macro-informationeconomicsnotonlystudiestheeconomicoperationoftheinformationindustry,butalsostudiestheinformatizationofthesocialmacro-economy.
[MicroInformationEconomicsCombinationwithMacroInformationEconomics]
Currently,Intheresearchprocessofinformationeconomics,theeconomicscommunitypaysmoreattentiontothedevelopmenttrendsofmicro-informationeconomics.Attachesgreatimportancetotheintroductionofmicro-informationeconomicsandthestudyofeconomicproblemsundervariousasymmetricinformationconditions.Theresearchonmacro-informationeconomicsislessinvolved.Althoughinformationandcommoditieshavedifferentcharacteristicsofcommodities.Asanewtypeofindustry,theinformationindustryalsohasitsownspecialeconomiclaws,butitismorevaluedbyinformationscholarsthaneconomists.Itispreciselybecauseofthisthatinformationeconomicshasinjectedvitalityandvitalityintoinformatics.Therearesomeextremelyactiveresearchersininformationeconomicsintheinformationsciencefield,whoarenotonlyengagedintheeconomicresearchofinformationcommoditiesandinformationindustries.Italsograduallyenteredthefieldofmicro-informationeconomics,andtriedtocombinethetwointoacompletesystem.Themainmethodistograduallytransitionfromthecontracttheorymanpowerunderasymmetricinformationconditionstothesearchforinformation(varioussignals),aswellasthecostofinformationandtransactioncosts,tothefieldofmacro-informationeconomics.
[ApplicationResearchofInformationEconomics]
Althoughmicro-informationeconomicsisalsocalledtheoreticalinformationeconomics,itsappliedresearchisnotSimplyequivalenttomacroinformationeconomics.Inthepasttwoyears,theappliedresearchofmicro-informationeconomicshasplayedanimportantroleinnotunderestimatingtheinstitutionalarrangementsandmarketnormsinthecurrenteconomicreformandtransitionperiodinChina,anditisapromisingresearchfieldininformationeconomics.
Asmentionedearlier,micro-informationeconomicsisthestudyofhowtoseekacontractandsystemtoarrangeandregulatetheeconomicbehaviorofbothpartiesundertheconditionsofuncertainandasymmetricinformation,alsoknownasasymmetricinformationeconomyLearningorcontracttheory.
Underthispremise,theresultofanyeconomicbehavioriscertainandunique.Therefore,thetaskofmicroeconomicsistooptimizethedecision-makingproblem,thatis,howtoachievetheoptimalallocationofresourcesandmaximizeefficiency.Andithasformedmanyeffectiveanalysismethodsinitsowndevelopment,whichmakesmicro-informationeconomicsmorepracticalthantraditionaleconomics,andcanstudyandsolvepracticaleconomicproblemsmoreextensivelyandin-depth.
[Summary]
Inessence,westerninformationeconomicsistheapplicationofasymmetricinformationgametheoryineconomics,anditismicroeconomicsnewdevelopment.Theproblemofgametheoryresearchisthatwhenthebehaviorsofdecision-makingpartiesinfluenceeachother'srespectivedecisionsandtheequilibriumthatthesedecisionscanachieve,theproblemofinformationeconomicsresearchisthatthereisasymmetricinformationwhenthebehaviorsofdecision-makingpartiesaffecteachother..Here,asymmetricinformationreferstoinformationthatsomeparticipantshavebutothersdonot.
Theinformationdiscussedininformationeconomicsreferstotheinformationthataffectstheinterestsofbothparties,ratherthantalkingaboutallpossibleinformation.Asymmetricinformationcanbedividedintotwocategoriesaccordingtocontent.
Onetypeistheasymmetryofknowledgebetweenthetwoparties,whichmeansthatonepartydoesnotknowtheotherparty'sinformationsuchasability,physicalhealth,etc.Thisisexogenousandpredetermined,notcausedbytheactionsofbothparties.Forthiskindofinformationasymmetry,informationeconomicscallsithiddenknowledgeandhiddeninformation.
Thesecondtypeofasymmetricinformationmeansthattheinformationheldbybothpartieswhensigningthecontractissymmetrical,butaftersigningthecontract,onepartycannotmanageorrestrictthebehavioroftheotherparty.ThisisendogenousanddependsonThebehavioroftheotherparty.Forthiskindofinformationasymmetry,informationeconomicscallsithiddenaction.Forexample,aftersigningacontract,theemployercannotfreelycontrolwhethertheemployeeworkshardorislazy.Tosolvethisproblem,itisnecessarytoimplementanincentivemechanismtoenableemployeestotaketherightactions.Forexample,whatkindofsalarysystemorwelfaresystemisusedtomakeemployeesworkhard.
Inspecificwork,youwillencountertheproblemofasymmetricinformationintwosituations.Accordingtothetimewhenasymmetricinformationoccurs,theinformationasymmetrythatoccursbeforetheeventwillcauseadverseselectionproblems,andtheinformationasymmetrythatoccursaftertheeventwillcausemoralhazard.
Adverseselectionandmoralhazardaretwobasicresearchtopicsofinformationeconomics.Forexample,whenchoosingacorporatemanager,iftheboardofdirectorsisnotclearaboutthemanager’sabilitiesinadvance,butthemanagerhimselfknows,adverseselectionproblemswillarise;ifbothpartiesknowthemanager’sabilitiesinadvancebutdonotknowthemanager’seffortlevelaftersigningthecontract,moralhazardwilloccurTheproblemhidestheaction;orthemanager’sabilityisnotknowninadvance,butthemanagerdiscovershisownabilityaftersigningthecontract,andtheboardofdirectorsisnotclear,itisalsoamoralhazardproblem,hidinginformation,becausethemanager’sdeparturemaytakeawaythecustomer.
Inthecaseofasymmetricinformation,adverseselectionandmoralhazardcanoccuratanytime.Westerninformationeconomicsbelievesthatthewaytoreduceorexemptistoestablishanincentivemechanismandasignaltransmissionmechanism.
Theoreticalsignificance
[Fromtraditionaleconomics]
Traditionaleconomicsbelievesthatpricescondenseallmarketinformation,Itsacquisitiondoesnotrequirecost,soitcanbeusedfreelybyallmarketparticipants.Inthisway,marketparticipantshavecompleteinformationabouttheoperationofthemarket.Theinteractionbetweendecision-makingindividualsisincludedinthepricethroughthemarket,anddirecteconomiccontactisnotequivalenttointeraction.Therefore,directinteractionoreconomicconnectiondoesnotconstitutethecontentoftraditionaleconomicanalysis.Thisimpliesthattraditionaleconomicanalysisdoesnotcontainprivateinformation,thatis,thereisnoinformationasymmetry.Therationalpersonhypothesishastwomeanings:oneis"selfishness"and"efficiency",thatis,"selfishness"and"profitmaximization";theotheristhatdecisionmakershavecompleteinformationtomakedecisions.Completeinformationdetermines:rationalityiscomplete,andindividualrationalitycanspontaneouslyreachcollectiverationality.Inthisway,decision-makingindividualsmakedecisionsunderagiveninformationparameter-price,andtheinteractionbetweenindividualsisincludedinthepricethroughthemarket.Thepricemechanismincludesallthecontentsofmarketeconomicactivities,andthemarketmechanismisequivalenttoincentives.Allcontentandmeansofrestraint.Throughtheroleofthe"invisiblehand"ofthemarket,individualrationalityspontaneouslyreachescollectiverationality,themarketisalwaysclear,andtheentireeconomyandsocietywilleventuallyreachtheidealstate-theParetooptimalstate.
[Fromtheperspectiveofinformationeconomics]
Informationeconomicsbelievesthatpricesareobtainedinsearch,atthecostofpaying.Therefore,theinformationisincomplete.Thisdeterminesthatcompetitionisincomplete,thereisdirectinteractionandinfluencebetweendecision-makingindividuals,andprivateinformationplaysanimportantrole.Therefore,theinformationisasymmetric.Undertheconditionsofincompleteandasymmetricinformation,completerationalitytransformsintoboundedrationality,thatis,economicindividualsareselfishandactinaccordancewiththeprincipleofmaximization,buttheyusuallydonothavetheinformationneededtomakeoptimaldecisions.Therefore,economicindividualsHisabilityislimited,andrationalityisalsolimited.Theresultofindividualrationalchoicemaybeirrational,andindividualrationalitydoesnotnecessarilyleadtocollectiverationality.Inthisway,thedirectinteractionandinfluenceamongdecision-makingindividualsbecomesthestartingpointofeconomicanalysis.Throughtheanalysisofthemechanismofinformation,especiallyprivateinformation,informationeconomicsrevealsthatindividualrationalitymayleadtocollectiveirrationality,andpricecannotcoverallmarketeconomicrelations.Therefore,themarketpricesystemisnolongertheentirecontentofincentivesandconstraints.Andmeans,the"non-price"mechanismhasbecomeanindispensablecontentofincentivesandrestraints.Theinformationeconomyusesmechanismdesigntheorytodesigna"non-price"systemtosolvethisproblem.