Economiclawlitigation
1.Antitrustlitigationisakindofeconomiclawlitigation
Beforetheemergenceofthelegaldepartmentofeconomiclaw.Inadditiontothenon-actionablelawssuchastheConstitution,civillaw,criminallaw,andadministrativelawhaveformedlitigationsystemswiththeirowncharacteristics,namely,civillitigation,criminallitigationandadministrativelitigation,andeachhasanindependentlitigationcodecorrespondingtoit.Whenscholarsproposedthateconomicsetbacksshouldbeanindependentlegaldepartment,someseparateeconomiclawshaveexistedformanyyears,andtheirlitigationmattershavealwaysbeenresolvedbythecivilprocedurelaw.
Currently,somescholarsbelievethatanindependenteconomiclawlitigationsystemthatonlyresolveseconomiclegaldisputes,oreconomicpublicinterestlitigationshouldbestipulated.Whetheranindependenteconomiclawlitigationsystemshouldbeestablishedisnotdiscussedinthisarticle,buttheauthorbelievesthatthelitigationforsolvingeconomiclawdisputesmaybecollectivelyreferredtoas"economiclawlitigation"inacademicresearch,inordertohelpsummarizethecommonalities.Theanti-monopolylawisanimportantpartoftheeconomiclaw.Therefore,theanti-monopolylitigationisofcourseaneconomiclawlitigation.Inthissense,beforethelegislativerecognitionof"economiclawlitigation"asanindependentlitigationsystem,theanti-monopolylawshouldalsoadoptotherlitigationmethodscommonlyusedineconomiclaw.Infact,thisisalsodoneinourjudicialpractice.
2.Antitrustlitigationisofapublicinterestnature
Thepublicinterestofantitrustlitigationisdeterminedbythepublicinterestoftheantitrustlaw.Asaproceduralact,litigationhasthetaskofensuringtherealizationoftheobjectivesofsubstantivelaw.Inordertorealizethepublicinterestoftheantitrustlaw,antitrustlitigationrequiressomespecialregulations.Itistheseregulationsintheantitrustsubstantivelawthatmakeantitrustlitigationpublicinterest..Forexample,whenthepublicinterestofsocietyisharmedbymonopolisticbehavior,theprocuratorialorganhastherighttofileacivillawsuittorequesttostoptheinfringement;whendeterminingtheintensityofthepunishmentformonopolisticbehavior,itshouldnotonlylookatthespecificeconomiclossescausedbythemonopolybehavior,butalsomeasureit.Theextentofthedestructionoftheeconomicordercausedbythemonopolisticbehavior,andsoon.
Jurisdiction
TheChineseword"jurisdiction"isderivedfromtheEnglishword"jurisdiction",butitsmeaninginthecommonlawsystemissimilartothatusedinthecivillawsystemwearefamiliarwithTheterm"jurisdiction"isverydifferent.
Thejurisdictionoflitigationinthecivillawsystemreferstothedivisionoflaborbetweenthecourtsonthemattersunderthejurisdictionofthecourtsonthepremisethatthecourtshavejurisdictiontodeterminetheacceptanceandtrialofcasesbetweendifferentcourts.Scope.Thecommonlawsystem,especiallytheUnitedStates,usesjurisdictiontodeterminewhetheritsfederalorstatecourtshavetherighttoacceptandhearacase.(BaiLu-hyun,1996)Ifweincludethepowerofacceptanceintothescopeofdiscussionoflitigationjurisdiction,thenitcanstillbesaidthatthejurisdictionofanti-monopolylitigationsolvesthequestionofwhichcourthearstheanti-monopolycase,anditisthroughthelevelofjurisdictionandgeographicalarea.Thelatitudeandlongitudeofjurisdictioncrosstodeterminethespecificcourt.Allcountriesthathaveimplementedanti-monopolylawshavearrangedspecificcourtsforanti-monopolycasesintheirjudicialsystems.
1.JurisdictionofantitrustlitigationintheUnitedStates
TheUnitedStatesisafederalcountry,andtherearetwosetsofcourtsystems,thefederalandstate.Forthisreason,Article4oftheUSShermanActclearlyauthorizestheDistrictCourttohaveexclusivejurisdictionoverfederalantitrustcases.(ShangMing,2004)"Forthejurisdictionstandard,theearliestShermanActonlystipulatedthatantitrustbehaviors"occurring"ininterstatecommerceshouldberegulated,andthelaterClaytonLawexpandedtheregulatedbehaviorsfurther.Itisanactthat"occurs"inor"influences"interstatecommerce.Whatisanactthataffectsinterstatecommerce?IntheHospitalBuildingCovTrusteesofRexHospitalcase,theSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatespointedoutthataslongasthesuedrestraintThebehaviorhadasubstantialadverseeffectoninterstatetrade,andtheplaintiffmetthejurisdictionalrequirements.
""Inarecentcaseconcerningthe"influenceofcommerce"standard(SummitHealthLtdvPinhascase)IntheUSSupremeCourt’sopinion,aslongasitcanbeprovedthatthedefendant’sactionshaveapotentialimpactontherelevantmarket,itcanbeconsideredthatthedefendant’sactionshaveasubstantialimpactoninterstatecommerce.Inthisregard,theUSSupremeCourtexplained:becauseofanyviolationofShellTheinfringementofArticle1oftheMannLawliesintheillegalnatureoftheillegalagreementitself,ratherthantheexternalimplementationoftheagreement.Therefore,theproperfocusofanalysisisnottheactualconsequences,but,iftheconspiracyissuccessful,itwillfollow.Therefore,theplaintiffdoesnothavetoclaimorproveasubstantialimpactoninterstatecommercewhenclaimingthatfederaljurisdictionisestablished.""Currently,thestandardof"influencingcommerce"isthemainstandardoffederalantitrustciviljurisdiction..
Afterdeterminingthattheantitrustcaseisunderthejurisdictionofthefederalcourt,whichfederalcourtwillhearthespecificcaseisdeterminedbythe“Venue”rules.Forexample,theShermanActArticle7states:"AnyonewhosufferspropertyorbusinessdamageduetomattersprohibitedbyantitrustlawsmayfilealawsuitintheU.S.DistrictCourtinthedistrictwherethedefendantresides,isfound,orhasanagency."Article7RegulationA:"WhenevertheUnitedStatessuffersdamagetopropertyorbusinessduetomattersprohibitedbyantitrustlaws,theUnitedStatesmaysuetheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtintheareawherethedefendantlives,wasdiscovered,orhasitsagency.ThefourtharticleoftheClaytonActalsomakesprovisionssimilartothoseoftheShermanAct,andArticle12providesamoregeneralruleonthetrialvenueforcasesinwhichthecompanyisthedefendant:"AccordingtoantitrustAlawsuitagainstacompanycanbefilednotonlyinthejurisdictionwherethecompanyisaresident,butalsoinanareawherethecompany’sviolationsarediscoveredoroperated.Alllitigationmaterials(complaints)canbeservedintheareawherethecompanyisaresidentorcanbeserved.Theareawhereitsbehaviorwasdiscovered."Fromtheprovisionsoftheabovelegalprovisions,wecanseethatthejurisdictionoftheUSantitrustlitigationactuallyfollowstheprincipleoftheplaintiffasthedefendant.
BecausetheUnitedStateshasafederalandstatedualcourtsystem,soTherearesomeuniquetransferandmergersystemsinitsantitrustlitigation,especiallywhenthesamematterisregulatedbyboththefederalantitrustlawandthestateantitrustlaw,thesamemattermaybeinboththefederalcourtandthestatecourt.Alawsuitisfiled.Atthistime,inordertoensuretheunityofjudicialprocessing,thecasemustbeconcentratedinonecourtforprocessing.Sometimesinordertomergethepre-trialdiscoveryprocedures,savejudicialresourcesandimprovejudicialefficiency,thecasewillalsobecarriedout.Transferandmergertrials.However,thesesystemsareoflittlesignificancetoourcountry,sothisarticlewillnotdiscussthem.
TherearesometransferandmergertrialsforthepurposeoffacilitatingjusticeintheUSantitrustlitigation.Therearecommonvaluesintheantitrustlitigationsystemsofvariouscountries.SomeAmericanscholarspointedoutthattheprovisionsofArticle12oftheClaytonActaretoenablelitigationtobeconductedattheplaceoftheplaintiffinsteadoftheplacewheretheforeigncompanyislocatedorwhereitisfound..Evenifanantitrustcasefullycomplieswiththerequirementsofthissectiononthevenue,itmaybetransferredinaccordancewith28USCl404(UnitedStatesCode)fortheconvenienceandjudicialinterestsofthepartiesandwitnesses.Inaddition,thechoiceofthecourtbytheplaintiffwillgenerallybeAcceptedunlessthereareotherreasonstoprovethatthisoptionwasunconsidered.
Antitrustcasesfiledinthewrongvenuewillberejectedortransferredtoanothercourtbasedonjudicialinterest.ThecourtisinThefactorsconsideredwhendecidingonareferralapplicationincludethecourtchosenbytheplaintiff;thelocationofthepartiesandpossiblewitnesses;theconvenienceofwitnessestotestifyincourt;thelocationofthedocumentstobeusedinthelitigation;thecostoflitigationinvariouscourts;andjudicialbenefits(e.g.,Thenumberofpendingcasesandtrialtimeintherelevantdistricts).Amongthem,theconvenienceofwitnessesisconsideredtobeaparticularlyimportantfactor.Theimportanceofthetestimonyofpossiblewitnessesisalsoanimportantfactorthatshouldbeconsideredaswellastheirnumber.Ofcourse,Whenmovingoutofthecourttotransferthecasetoadistrictthatisnotconvenientfortheplaintiff,thefinancialstatusoftheplaintiffisalsoafactorthatshouldbeconsidered.
2.JurisdictionofEUantitrustlitigation
DuetoviolationAntitrustlitigationcausedbyEUcompetitionlawisexclusivelyacceptedandjudgedbytheEuropeanCourtofFirstInstanceandthesecondcourtoftheEuropeanCourtofJustice.Regardlessofthecountrywheretheplaintiffislocated,antitrustlitigationcausedbyviolationofEUcompetitionlawcanonlybemadeinthesetwocourts.Thereisnopossibilityoflitigationinothercourts.
3.Germanantitrustlitigationjurisdiction
Germanyimplementsafederalsystem,andthecountryisdividedintothreelevels:region,state,andfederal.Thecorrespondingordinarycourtsaredividedintofourlevels:districtcourts,statecourts,statehighcourts,andfederalsupremecourts.Thefour-tierthree-instancesystemisimplemented.Forthisreason,Article87oftheGermanAnti-RestrictionofCompetitionActauthorizesthestatecourtsMonopolizetheexclusivejurisdictionofcivilcases,andstipulatethatitisbeneficialtothetrialofcartelcasesAndtoensuretheunityofjudicialprecedents,onestatecourtcanhearantitrustcasesinmultiplecourtjurisdictions.
OneofthecharacteristicsoftheGermanantitrustlitigationsystemistheestablishmentofaspecialcartel.ThecartelestablishedbytheStateHighCourtacceptsappealsfiledbythepartiesagainstthejudgmentsmadebythestatecourtsincivilantitrustcases,complaintsfiledagainstotherrulingsmadebythestatecourtsincivilantitrustcases,andtheAnti-RestrictionofCompetitionActSpeciallydesignatedcasestobeheard.Casesacceptedbyspecialdesignationmainlyrefertolitigationfiledbythepartieswhoarenotsatisfiedwiththesanctionsofthecartelauthorities,andareexclusivelyunderthejurisdictionofthehighcourtofthestatewheretheCartelauthoritiesarelocated.
Similarly,forthepurposeoffacilitatingtrialsandensuringtheuniformityofjudicialprecedents,oneorseveralstatehighcourtsorthefederalsupremecourtcanhearalllegalcasesthatshouldbeundertheexclusivejurisdictionofstatehighcourts.TheGermanFederalSupremeCourtalsosetupacarteltoacceptcomplaintsandretrialcasesthatmeetitslevelofjurisdiction.
AsamemberoftheEuropeanUnion,antitrustactionsinGermanymaynotonlyviolateGermanantitrustlaws,butmayalsoviolateantitrust-relatedprovisionsintheTreatyoftheEuropeanCommunityortheAgreementontheEuropeanEconomicArea.AccordingtotheprovisionsofArticle96oftheAnti-RestrictionofCompetitionActofGermany,forthosearisingfromArticle85orArticle86oftheTreatyoftheEuropeanCommunities,orArticle53orArticle54oftheAgreementontheEuropeanEconomicAreaForcivildisputes,theprovisionsofArticles87to90andArticles91to95shallapplymutatismutandis.Thatis,thefirstinstanceisacceptedbythestatecourts,andthesecondinstanceisacceptedbythestatehighcourts;thejudgmentofacertainlegaldisputedependsinwholeorinpartonwhetherArticle85orArticle86oftheTreatyoftheEuropeanCommunitiesortheAgreementontheEuropeanEconomicAreaareapplied."Article53orArticle54shallbegovernedbyArticle87,paragraph1,whichisalsosubjecttotheexclusivejurisdictionofthestatecourts.ItcanbeseenthattheprincipleofdeterminingjurisdictionisthesamewhetheritisalawsuitbroughtunderGermanlaworunderEuropeanCommunitylaw.
4.Jurisdictionofanti-monopolylitigationinJapan
Differentfromtheabove-mentionednationalanti-monopolylitigationjurisdictionsystem,Japan’s"ProhibitionofPrivateMonopolyandEnsuringFairTradingLaw"stipulatesthattheTokyoHighCourtisexclusivelyThescopeofthejurisdictionofspecificcasesalsostipulatesthegeneralprovisionsofotherprocedurallawsforthejurisdictionofothercases.
AccordingtotheprovisionsofArticle85andArticle86oftheAct,theTokyoHighCourthasjurisdiction(DrelatedtoJapaneseFTClitigation;②Regardingtheno-faultdamageslitigationstipulatedinArticle25③ProceedingsconcerningthecrimesofArticle89toArticle91.Inaddition,exemptionfromexecutionofjudgment,confiscationofdepositedproperty,emergencystoporder,finesforviolationoftherulingandviolationofemergencystoporderduetodepositCasessubjecttofinesareexclusivelyunderthejurisdictionoftheTokyoHighCourt.Undersuchregulations,Japandoesnotconsiderthelocationoftheplaintiffandthedefendant,becausethecourtistheonlyone.
Inaddition,inordertocomplywiththerevisedtwenty-fourthTherighttostoptheinfringementsystemstipulatedinArticlehasbeenaddedtoArticle84bis,whichstipulatesthatfor“requesttostoptheinfringement”litigation,thecourtsthathavetherighttoacceptthefirstinstanceshallnotonlycomplywithArticles4and5oftheJapaneseCivilProcedureLaw.Inadditiontothedistrictcourtswithfirst-instancejurisdictionundertheprovisionsofArticle,thedistrictcourtswherethehighcourtsarelocatedandtheTokyoDistrictCourtalsohavetheWherealawsuitforstoppingorpreventinginfringementunderArticle24isbrought,thecourtmayconsiderthedomicileofthepartyconcernedwhenitisrelatedtothelawsuitunderthesamearticlethatisacceptedbyothercourtsandisrelatedtothesameorthesametypeofconduct.Theplaceorlocation,theresidenceofthewitnesstobequestioned,thepointofcontentionorthecommonalityofevidence,andothercircumstances,andwhendeemedappropriate,transferallorpartofthelawsuittotheothercourtorinthecaseofthelawsuitbasedontheapplicationorauthorityOthercourtsthathavejurisdictioninaccordancewiththefirstparagraphofArticle84bis.ThisisalsotoensurethespecializationanduniformityofJapan’sprohibitionofmonopolyjudicialactivities.
TheTokyoHighCourtwasoriginallyatrialcourt.Thecourt,whichisdominatedbysecond-instancecases,acceptsanti-monopolylitigationinthefirstinstance.ItcanbeseenthatJapanattachesgreatimportancetoanti-monopolylitigation.AnotherreasonfortheestablishmentofexclusivejurisdictionisduetotheprejudgmentdoctrineinJapanesedamageslitigation.Concentratingononecourtisconvenientformakingspecializedandunifiedjudgments,anditisalsoconducivetotherapidsettlementofthecaseandthetimelyjudicialreliefofthevictims.
However,someJapanesescholarshaveputforwarddifferentviewsonthis.TheybelievethatthisapproachhascausedalotofinconveniencetovictimsoutsidetheTokyoarea.Nomatterwhat,itisunquestionabletogivespecialtreatmenttoantitrustlitigation.
Ascanbeseenfromtheaboveintroduction,infact,Japan’sapproachisalsothepracticeofmostcountriesintheworld,thatis,thefirstinstanceofantitrustcasesisunderthejurisdictionofacourtabovethemiddlelevelinthecountry’sjudicialsystem.It’sjustthatJapan’sintentiontoensuretheuniformityofjudgmentsisbroughttotheextreme---Thefirstinstanceofanti-monopolycasesisconcentratedinonecourt.Itcanbeseenthatallcountrieshavefullyconsideredthedifficultyofhandlinganti-monopolycasesandshouldbetreatedwithhigh-leveljudicialpersonnelandtriallevels.Inaddition,itcanalsobeseenthatcountriesarestipulatingjurisdictions.Atthattime,wehavenoticedthewideandscatteredinfluenceofantitrustcases.Therefore,specialattentionhasbeenpaidtofacilitatingthetrialandensuringtheunityofcasehandling.Forthisreason,Acertaindegreeofcentralizedtrialandagreedjurisdictionisallowed.
Subject
Thesubjectoflitigationreferstothepersonwhoenjoyslitigationrightsandundertakeslitigationobligationsinlitigation.Thesubjectofanti-monopolylitigationisdifferentduetoanti-monopolycivillitigationandanti-monopolycriminallitigation.Becausethelegalrelationshipoflitigationisboundtothecourtasoneparty,thisarticlewilldiscussthepartiesinanti-monopolylitigation.
Thepartiestotheantitrustlitigationaredividedintotwocategories:theplaintiffandthedefendant.Thequalificationsofdefendantsinanti-monopolylitigationarerelativelyuniformintheanti-monopolylawsofvariouscountries.Aslongastheyareconsideredtobelikelytoimplementmonopolyandaffectcompetition,theywillberegulatedbytheanti-monopolylawandmaybecomedefendantsinspecificcases.Forexample,theU.S.antitrustlawdoesnotspecifythetargetsoftheantitrustlaw.Thedirectuseoftheterm"defendant"inthelawtorefertothispossibilitygroupshouldbeunderstoodastheShermanlawthatimplementsanymattersprohibitedbytheantitrustlaw.Allthe"persons"specifiedmaybecomedefendantsinantitrustlitigation.JudicialpracticeintheUnitedStatescanalsoseethatunderthelegaltraditionofunwrittenlawsintheUnitedStates,thequalificationsofspecificpartiesincasesaredeterminedbyjudgesinspecificcases.Therefore,theabsenceofexpressprovisionsinthelawdoesnothinderlawenforcement.
AscanbeseenfromthedefinitioninArticle2ofChapter1oftheAnti-MonopolyLawofJapan,itcanbeseenthatinJapan,businessesandbusinessgroupsmaybecomedefendantsinantitrustlitigationforobstructingcompetition.Theformerrefersto"Personsengagedincommerce,industry,finance,andotherbusinesses,andcadres,practitioners,agents,andotherpersonnelwhocarryoutactivitiesforthebenefitofthebusinesspersonshallberegardedasbusinessiftheprovisionsofthefollowingparagraphandChapter3(Businessintoagroup)applyThelatterreferstothe“combinationorconsortiumoftwoormorebusinesspersonswhosemainpurposeistoenhancethecommoninterestsofbusinesspersons."However,whohastherighttofileanantitrustlawsuitastheplaintiffisverydifferent.Anditischanging.
Thereasonforthegreatdifferenceliesinthedifferentanti-monopolylawenforcementsystemsarrangedbyvariouscountries,andthescopeofsubjectsallowedtoenteranti-monopolylitigationisalsodifferent.Inaddition,italsodependsonthescopeoflawenforcementofacountry'santi-monopolylawenforcementagencies,theextenttowhichindividualsareallowedtoparticipate,andsoon.
1.Plaintiffsincivilantitrustlitigation
1.PlaintiffsincivilantitrustlitigationintheUnitedStates
TheplaintiffsincivilantitrustlitigationintheUnitedStatesshowdistinctdiversityAndrichness.Thefirstisthatastheantitrustlawenforcementagency,theAntitrustDivisionoftheUSDepartmentofJusticeandtheUSFTCcanbothinitiatecivillawsuitsandappealforjudgmentsthatprohibitcontinuedviolationsofthelaw.Article16oftheUSFTCspecificallyempowerstheUSFTCtofilerequestsforinjunctivereliefandconsumerprotectionlitigationonitsownbehalf.Secondly,thestateattorneygeneralcaninitiatecivillawsuitsforcontinuingillegalissuanceofinjunctionsanddamagesunderthefederalantitrustlawundercertaincircumstances.Third,inresponsetoantitrustdamageslitigation,theantitrustlawdoesnotspecifythescopeoftheplaintiff,butinsteadusestheterm"anyone"inthelaw.Inthisregard,someAmericanscholars,basedonAmericanjudicialpractice,concludedthatthesubjectswhohavetherighttoinitiatecompensationproceedingsinclude:A.Naturalpersonsandlegalpersons;B.UnitedStatesFederation;c.Foreigngovernments(exceptthosenotrecognizedbytheUnitedStatesandthosenotinapeacefulstate);D.Thestategovernment(especiallywhenitsuffersfromfixedpricesingovernmentprocurement).
(IrvingScher,1999)Thesefourtypesofsubjectsarenotcompletelythesameintermsofrightsandobligations.Thebiggestdifferenceisthatnaturalpersonsandlegalpersonswhohavesufferedmonopolydamagesasplaintiffscangetthreetimesthedamages,litigationfeesandreasonableattorneyfees,whiletheUSfederalandforeigngovernmentsasplaintiffsgenerallycanonlygetactuallossesCompensationandlitigationcostscanonlybetripledunderspecialcircumstances(suchaswhentheUnitedStatesisthepurchaserofcertaingoodsandservices(KongXiangjun,2001)).
Inordertoensuretheinterestsofindividualsasvulnerablegroups,theUSantitrustlawintroducedaclassactionsystem.Specifically,itisdividedintoclassactionsfiledbythestateattorneygeneralandclassactionsnotfiledbythestateattorneygeneral.TheformerisbasedontheHart-Scott-RudinanAntitrustActof1976,whichstipulatesthattheAttorneyGeneralofeachstaterepresentstheinterestsofnaturalpersonsintheirstates,andcanapplytothosewhohavejurisdictionoverthedefendantinthenameofthestate.TheU.S.DistrictCourtfiledacivillawsuittoensurethatitsnaturalpersonsufferedmonetarylossesduetoothers'violationoftheShermanLaw.Thisisalsocalledaclassactioninwhichthestategovernmentactsasaguardian.Becausethiskindofrequestrepresentstheinterestsofnaturalpersons,itcangetthreetimesthecompensationandreasonableattorney'sfees.Inaddition,afterthestateattorneygeneralfiledalawsuit,thethreespecifictypesoflawsuitswererevisedthroughamendments.Consumerclassactionlawsuitsoftenbecomeawaytoobtaintriplecompensationinantitrustlawsuits.
Ontheissueofwhetherconsumerscanfiledamagessuits,somescholarsbelievethattheUnitedStateshasanegativeattitude,thatis,consumersarenotallowedtofiledamagessuits.Theauthordisagreeswiththisview.
Firstofall,theterm"anyone"usedintheUS"ShermanAct"and"ClaytonAct"doesnotexcludeconsumers,nordoesitspecifythatanyoneheremustbeanoperator.Moreover,asthescholarsaid,thescopeofdamagecausedbymonopolisticbehaviorisverywide.Itmaybeoperatorsofthesamebusinessorsimilarbusinesses,upstreamanddownstreamoperatorsofthesamebusiness,orgeneralconsumers..Whentheactorwhoimplementsthemonopolisticbehaviorisaretailer,theconsumeristhedirectpurchaser,thatis,thedirectvictim,andofcoursehastherighttofilealawsuitfordamagesinaccordancewiththeanti-monopolylaw.Inpractice,theconsumerclassactiondirectlybasedonArticle23oftheUSFederalRulesofCivilProcedureisanimportantformforconsumerstobringdamages.Inaddition,althoughtheUSfederalantitrustlawrestrictsplaintiffsinfixedpricecasestodirectpurchasers,theantitrustlawsofsomestatesprovidereliefforindirectpurchasers(suchasNewMexico).Asafederalcountry,thefederalantitrustlawsandstateantitrustlawsformtheUnitedStatesantitrustlaws.Therefore,itcannotbesimplysaidthattheUSantitrustlawsdonotallowconsumerstofiledamagessuits.
2.ThesubjectofJapaneseantitrustcivillitigation
TheJapaneseantitrustlaw,whichusestheUSantitrustlawasitsparentlaw,pursuesadministrativecentralismintheimplementationoftheantitrustlaw,andisestablishedJapan’sFTCisaquasi-judicialinstitutionthatcanindependentlytryanti-monopolycasesandcanimposepenaltiesonthepartieswithoutgoingthroughthecourt,soitisnotaplaintiffwhofiledacivillawsuitinthecourt.
Regardingthequalificationsoftheplaintiffinanti-monopolycivillitigation,theJapaneseAnti-MonopolyLawclearlystipulatestherightofnaturalpersonstoinitiatecivillitigation,butitisrestrictedtoacertainextent.Indamageslitigation,inaccordancewiththeprovisionsofArticles25and26oftheJapaneseAnti-MonopolyLaw,onlyaftertheJapaneseFTChasmadeafactualdeterminationofthecorrespondingillegalactandmadeadetermination,thespecificThevictimcanclaimhis"righttoclaimdamageswithoutfault"throughjudicialproceedings.Thejudicialpracticeofanti-monopolylitigationinJapanhasprovedthatthevictimswhohavetherighttoinitiatedamageslitigationincludenotonlybusinessoperatorsbutalsoconsumers8".
TheprohibitionofmonopolylawwasrevisedonMay12,2000.Article24addsthe"righttorequesttostoptheinfringement".Theprovisiondoesnotlimitthescopeoftheplaintiff.Itdirectlystipulatesthat"whentheinterestsoftheplaintiffareorwillbeviolatedinArticle8,Paragraph1,Item5or19IntheeventofinfringementoftheactsstipulatedintheArticle,andtheresultingorwillcauseobviousloss,theinjuredortheto-bevictimmayrequestthebusinessorbusinessorganizationthatinfringesorisabouttoinfringetheirintereststostoporpreventtheinfringement.”Therefore,itshouldbeconsideredTheplaintiffwhohastherighttostoptheinfringementrequestisalso“anyone”.
3.TheplaintiffinGermanantitrustcivillitigation
TheGermanlegislationdoesnotstipulatethescopeoftheplaintifffromtheplaintiff’spointofview,butfromtheperspectiveoftheplaintiff.Fromtheperspectiveoftheimplementerofmonopolybehavior,itisstipulatedthatthemonopolistshallbeartheresponsibilityofstoppingtheinfringementandcompensationfordamages.Infact,itmeansthatanyonewhobelievesthattheirlegitimaterightsandinterestshavebeeninfringedbythemonopolisticbehaviorcanfileananti-monopolycivillawsuit.Atthesametime,thereisaspecialprovision.Themainbodyof"BusinessInterestPromotionAssociation"canexercisetherighttostopinfringement.
Tosumup,wecanseethattheUnitedStatesandGermanyhavefewerrestrictionsonthequalificationsofplaintiffsinantitrustcivillitigation,andmoreConsideringtheactualdamagecausedbymonopolisticbehavior,itleavesthegreatestspaceforthevictimstogetcompensation.TheJapaneseanti-monopolylawhasrelativelylargerestrictions.ThebiggestrestrictionistheJapaneseFTCindamageslitigation.Adjudicationinadvance.Althoughthepossibilityandpredictabilityofprivatelitigationaregreatlyenhancedunderthepremiseofadjudicationinadvance,forvictimsofunadjudicatedmonopolisticbehavior,thejudicialsystemofantitrustcivillitigationisadopted.Itwouldbeimpossibletoclaimcompensationfordamages.
2.Plaintiffsinantitrustcriminalproceedings
1.PlaintiffsinU.S.antitrustcriminalproceedings
U.S.JusticeTheMinistry’sAntitrustDepartment,asaspecializedprosecutionagency,hastheexclusiverighttoprosecutethecriminalnormsoftheFederalAntitrustLaw.Thelaw,especiallywhenitisagainstthosebehaviorsthataredefinedastheirownviolations.Thespecificoperationisthattheprosecutorsofeachdistrict,inaccordancewiththeinstructionsoftheattorneygeneral,fileanequitylawsuitintheirrespectivedistricts.
2.JapanPlaintiffsinantitrustcriminalproceedings
Article96oftheJapaneseAnti-MonopolyLawprovidesspecialprovisionsforinitiatingcriminalproceedings,thatis,grantingJapantherightto“exclusivelyreport”theFTC,onlyaftertheJapaneseFTCinforms,theJapaneseProsecutorscaninitiatecriminalproceedings.
AndthetrialofantitrustcriminalproceedingsisexclusivelyunderthejurisdictionoftheTokyoHighCourt.
TheantitrustcriminalproceedingsintheUnitedStatesandJapanarebasicallystillItiscarriedoutwithintheframeworkofitsowncountry’scriminalprocedurelaw,anditalsohasthecharacteristicsofanti-monopolylaw.Othercountries,suchasGermany,donotprovideforanti-monopolycriminalliability.,AndEUcountrieshavenotagreedtograntthepowerofcriminalpunishmenttoEUagencies,sotherearenocorrespondingprovisionsonplaintiffsinanti-monopolycriminalproceedings.
FormsofLiability
Inordertoensuretheeffectiveimplementationoftheanti-monopolylaw,allcountrieshavestipulatedintheirownanti-monopolylawthesanctionsthatshouldbeadopted,andthecombinationofvariousformsofliabilityAnestablishedaccountabilitysystem.Thedifferenceisthateachhasitsownemphasis.
1.CivilLiabilityforAnti-monopolyLitigation
Anti-monopolycivilliabilityistheadverseconsequencesthatanti-monopolyoffendersshouldbearbecausetheirmonopolisticbehaviordamagesthelegitimaterightsandinterestsofotherequalcivilsubjects,Generallyincludescompensationfordamagesandcessationofinfringement.Theimplementationofmonopolisticbehaviorwillinevitablydamagethelegitimaterightsandinterestsofotherlegaloperatorsandconsumers.Accordingtotheprinciplesofcivillaw,victimsshouldbegiventheopportunitytoseekrelief.Onthecontrary,thiskindofbehaviorisdesignedtomaketheoffenderpaythepriceforhisillegalbehavior.Thereliefcanalsoeffectivelyeliminate,inhibitorevenreducetheoccurrenceofillegalacts.Accordingtostatisticsbyscholars,amongthemembercountriesoftheOrganisationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment(OECD),therearetencountriesthathaveimplementedasystemofclaimsfordamagesforviolationsofcompetitionlawandasystemofprohibitionrequests(includingthosethatrecognizeprohibitionrequestsinthecivillaw):Australia,UnitedKingdom,France,Italy,Netherlands,NewZealand,Sweden,Switzerland,UnitedStates,Japan.Thisshowsthatthecivilremedysystemsindevelopedcountriesarerelativelycomplete.
1.CivilLiabilityinAntitrustLitigationintheUnitedStates
Overviewoftheantitrustlawsofvariouscountriesintheworld,itisundoubtedlytheUnitedStatesthatmaximizestheroleofcivilliability.ThecivilliabilityoftheUSantitrustlawismainlycompensationfordamages.Inaddition,wecanoftenseethattheantitrustlawenforcementagencyintheUnitedStatescanfileacivillawsuitinthecourttorequestarulingtostoptheinfringement.However,itshouldbenotedthat,exceptforcriminalcases,theU.S.courtsusecivilprocedurestoresolveothercases,andadministrativeagenciesoftenneedtomakethedefendantbearadministrativeresponsibilitythroughcivilprocedures.Therefore,thecivilprocedureintheUnitedStatesalsobearstheresponsibilitiesoftheadministrativeprocedureinthecivillawsystem.Accordingtothetheoriesofthecivillawsystemwearefamiliarwith,civillitigationisaprivatelawlitigation,whichprotectstheinterestsofprivatelaw(privateinterests),whiletheanti-monopolyenforcementagencyprosecutestoexercisemanagementfunctionsonbehalfofthestateandprotectstheinterestsofpubliclaw(Publicwelfare).Therefore,theauthorbelievesthatthestopinfringementlawsuitfiledbytheUSantitrustenforcementagencytothecourtisawaytorealizeadministrativeresponsibility,ratherthanmakingmonopolisticactorsbearcivilliability,soIwon’tdiscussithere.
Article4oftheClaytonActoftheUnitedStatesstipulatesthat"anyonewhosufferspropertyorbusinessdamageduetomattersprohibitedbytheantitrustlaw"caninitiateacivillawsuit,andthewinnercanreceivethreetimesthecompensation,Litigationfeesandreasonableattorneyfees.WhenantitrustviolationsdamagetheinterestsoftheUnitedStates,theUnitedStatescanalsoobtaincompensationforactuallossesandlitigationcostsinthesameway.Thiskindoflitigationissubjecttoordinarycivillitigationprocedures.ItcanbeseenfromArticle4thatanyviolationoftheantitrustlawcanleadtodamages.Ifaprivatethree-foldcompensationlawsuitwins,theoffenderwillhavetopaythemostexpensivepriceforthis.Therefore,thefocusisontheuseofcivilliability.DeterrencehasachievedaverygoodeffectinreducingillegalactivitiesintheUnitedStates.Inpractice,thenumberofsuchlawsuitsfiledbyprivateindividualsfarexceedsthosefiledbygovernmentlawenforcementagencies.Naturalpersonswhofiledamageslawsuitsevenenjoy"privateprosecutors"."",butundertheincentiveofmoney,thenegativeeffectoftheabuseofthetriplecompensationlawsuithasalsoappeared.
2.Civilliabilityinanti-monopolylitigationinJapan
Japanprovidestwotypesofcivilliabilityfordamagecompensationandsuspensionofinfringement.UnliketheUnitedStatesthatdoesnotrestrictthetypesofantitrustactionsthatmaycausedamages,Article25oftheJapaneseAnti-MonopolyLawstipulatesthescopeofantitrustactionsthatmaycausedamages.Onlytheimplementationof"privatemonopoly"and"Businessesthatimproperlyrestricttransactions"anduse"unfairtradingmethods",andbusinessesthathaveconcludedaninternationalagreementorcontractthatimproperlyrestrictstransactions,etc.(thatis,violatedArticle6)andviolatedArticle8Onlythebusinessorganizationsspecifiedinthefirstparagraph(ProhibitedActsofBusinessOrganizations)areliablefordamages.
TheliabilityfordamagesinviolationofArticle6andArticle8Paragraph1wasaddedtoArticle25whenitwasrevisedin2000.
AccordingtothesecondparagraphofArticle25,theliabilityforcivildamagesshallbeno-faultliability.Ifthebusinessoperatorprovesthatithasnointentionornegligence,theliabilitystipulatedintheprecedingparagraphcannotbeexempted.AnotherpointdifferentfromtheUnitedStatesisthatJapandoesnotendowtheliabilityfordamageswiththecolorofpunishment.Thedamagestobepaidbytheoffenderisonlytheactuallossofthevictim,thatis,singlecompensationinsteadoftriplecompensation.
Article26stipulatesthattheJapaneseAnti-MonopolyLawappliesaspecialfeatureofcivilliability,thatis,"pre-judgmentdoctrine".Accordingtothisregulation,onlyaftertheJapaneseFTChasmadeafactualdeterminationofthecorrespondingviolationsandmadecorrespondingrulings(includingadjudicationrulings,agreedrulings,andadvisingrulings),thevictimscanfileadamagessuittothecourt.Andinthelitigation,thecourtshouldsolicittheopinionsoftheJapaneseFTContheamountofdamages.However,judicialprecedentsestablishthatregardlessofwhetherthejudgmentisdetermined,thevictimcanapplyfordamagesinaccordancewiththeillegalactsofthecivillaw,whichcanbesaidtohaveplayedaroleinmitigatingFTCcentralism.
Thetwenty-fourthadditionalprovisionsoftheAnti-MonopolyLawrevisedin2000:TheinterestsareorwillbeinfringedbyactsthatviolatetheprovisionsofArticle8,Paragraph1,Item5orArticle19,andaresubjecttoVictimsorprospectivevictimswhohavecausedorwillhaveobviouslossescanrequesttheinfringingorabouttoinfringetheirintereststostoporpreventtheirinfringement.Thisrequestincludestwobasiccontents.Oneistostoporcanceltheviolation,andtheotheristostopordestroythecorrespondingmeans,facilitiesandequipmentusedtoensuretheeffectivenessoftheviolation.
Ofcourse,duetothevariabilityofspecificillegalacts,thespecificcontentoftherequesttostoptheinfringementinpracticewillvarywiththecontentofthespecificcase.AlthoughJapanprovidesforcivilremedies,thesetwosystemsarenotusedfrequentlyandthesuccessrateisevenlower.JapanesescholarsthereforebelievethatJapan’santi-monopolycivilremediesarenotperfect,andpointedoutthatthereasoniscertainlythesameasthatofJapan.Theculturaltraditionofthelitigationisrelated,andmoreimportantly,becausethecivilremedysystemanditsspecificcontentarenotyetconvenientforvictimstouse.
3.CivilLiabilityinGermanAntitrustLitigation
Article33oftheGermanAnti-RestrictionofCompetitionActalsostipulatestheviolator’sliabilityfordamagesandthevictim’srequestforsuspensionRight:"Anyonewhoviolatestheprovisionsofthislaworthepunishmentbythecartelauthorityshallbeobligatedtostoptheillegalactwithinthelimitoftheprovisionsorthepunishmentforthepurposeofprotectingothers;iftheperpetratorisdeliberateornegligent,heshallalsobeliableTheobligationtocompensateforthedamagecausedbytheillegalact.TherighttorequestthesuspensionmayalsobeclaimedbytheAssociationforthePromotionofIndustrialandCommercialInterestswiththerightcapacity."ThecivilliabilityinGermanyisstricterthantheJapaneseconditionsinthatitrequirestheoffendertohaveintentionalorNegligence,suchstrictrulesasapplyingtheprincipleofnegligenceinantitrustlitigationarealsorareintheantitrustlawsofothercountries.Inaddition,fortheplaintiff,onlythosewhoserightsareprotectedbytheruleorthesanctionarealsolimited.Thatistosay,iftheprohibitionistoprotectabstractcompetition,privateindividualshavenorighttodemandcompensationfromthosewhoviolatetheprohibition.Forexample,theprohibitiononbusinessmergersonlyprotectsabstractcompetition.
4.CivilliabilityinEUantitrustlitigation
AlthoughtheEUlawdoesnotclearlystipulatethatvictimsofpropertydamageduetorestrictivecompetitionbehaviorscanfilealawsuitfordamagestotheEuropeanCommissionorInactionsofinactionrequestcivil/compensation.However,sinceArticle81(1)andArticle82oftheEUTreatycanbedirectlyappliedinEUmemberstates,thevictimcanfiledamagesinaccordancewiththecivilprocedurelawofthememberstates.Compensationsuit.
Fromtheaboveintroductionandanalysis,wecanseethattheregulationsonanti-monopolycivilliabilityinvariouscountriesarequiteconsistent,thatis,theyallstipulatethesuspensionofinfringementandcompensationfordamages.AlthoughtheUSantitrustlawonlystatesthatdamagescanbeclaimedinantitrustcivillitigation,inpractice,stoppingtheinfringementisactuallythenaturalprerequisiteandmeaningofdamages.Becauseonceanenterprise’sbehaviorisfoundtobeillegal,itisaminimumrequirementtoorderittostopthebehavior,otherwiseitwouldbemeaninglesstorequestcompensation.
2.CriminalLiabilityforAntitrustLitigation
1.CriminalLiabilityforAntitrustLitigationintheUnitedStates
ThecurrentUSShermanActwillbeantitrustbehaviorDefinedasaseriouscrime,itstipulatestwotypesofcriminalliability:imprisonmentandfines.Withtheintroductionoftheamendment,criminalliabilityhasbecomemoresevere.Themaximumfinesaregettinghigherandhigher,andthemaximumperiodofimprisonmentisgettinghigherandhigher.long.
Asthemoststringentsanctions,notallantitrustactionsaresubjecttocriminalresponsibility.IntheUnitedStates,themaintargetsofpenaltiesareagreements,alliances,andpublicConspiracyandmonopolisticbehavior.In1890,theShermanActstipulatedamaximumfineof$5,000andamaximumimprisonmentperiodofoneyear,orboth.The1955amendmentincreasedthemaximumfineto50,000U.S.dollars.The1974amendment(iethecurrentShermanAct)stipulatedthatthefineforcompanieswasincreasedfrom50,000U.S.dollarsto1millionU.S.dollars,thefineforindividualswasincreasedfrom50,000U.S.dollarsto100,000U.S.dollars,andtheimprisonmentperiodwasalsoincreasedfromoneyear.Increasetothreeyears.AccordingtotheprovisionsoftheUSAntitrustLaw,thecriminalliabilityofindividualsforviolatingtheantitrustlawisfineandimprisonment.Companiesviolatingtheantitrustlawaresubjecttoadoublepenaltysystem,thatis,afineisimposedonthecompanyandthepersondirectlyresponsiblefortheantitrustactionshallbefinedorimprisonedorimprisoned.Botharesidebyside.
2.CriminalliabilityinantitrustlitigationinJapan
Japan’s"ProhibitionofPrivateMonopolyandEnsuringFairTradingLaw"oncriminalliabilityisfoundinChapter10ofthePenaltyProvisions,whichbecameThebehaviorsofcriminalpenaltiesaremainly"privatemonopoly","unfairtransactionrestriction","shareholding"and"managementpersonnelconcurrentlyserving"thathaveseverelydisruptedtheorderofmarketcompetition.Theillegalactsofusing"unfairtradingmethods",mergersandbusinesstransfersthatviolatetheprohibitionregulations,arenotwithinthescopeofcriminalsanctionssetbytheAnti-MonopolyLaw.Criminalliabilityalsotakestheformoffinesandimprisonment.Thecriminalliabilityforindividualsviolatingtheantitrustlawisfinesandimprisonment.Companiesviolatingtheantitrustlawsimplementadoublepenaltysystem,thatis,imposingafineonthecompanyandimposingafineorimprisonmentonthepersondirectlyresponsiblefortheantitrustactOrboth.Generally,themaximumpenaltyforanindividualis3yearsimprisonmentorafineoflessthan5millionyen,andthemaximumpenaltyforaunitisafineoflessthan100millionyen.
CriminalresponsibilityformonopolisticbehavioristhechoicemadebytheUnitedStatesandJapantostrengthenthedeterrenceofanti-monopolylaws.Theseverityofpenaltiesvarieswiththedevelopmentofeconomicconditions.Themoredevelopedthemarketeconomy,themoredestructiveandinfluencemonopolisticbehaviorwillhaveontheeconomicorder.ThecurrentregulationsintheUnitedStatesandJapanhavebeenrevisedseveraltimes,andtheoveralltrendisthatpenaltiesareincreasing.
ExceptfortheUnitedStatesandJapan,theantitrustlawsofGermanyandothercountriesdonotprovideforcriminalliability.AndbecausetheEuropeanUnionisnotasovereigncountrybutaninternationalorganization,itsmembercountrieshavenotyetagreedtotransfertheircriminaljurisdictiontotheEuropeanUnion.Therefore,althoughsomeEUscholarsbelievethatinordertoensurethestrictapplicationofEUcompetitionlaw,theEUmustalsodevelopcriminalliabilitysimilartothatimposedbytheUSantitrustlawonnaturalpersons.”Currently,theEUdoesnothavetherighttopenalizecriminals,soitdoesnotexistatthelevelofEUcompetitionlaw.Criminalliabilityforanti-monopoly.
System
I.Basicprinciplesofanti-monopolylitigationinChina
1.Economicprinciples
EconomyTheprinciplehastwomeanings.Oneistheeconomicnatureofmonopolybehavior.Monopolybehavioriseconomicbehaviorfirst.Monopolistsalwaystrytohidethepurposeofmonopolywiththeappearanceoflegaleconomicbehavior.Anti-monopolylitigationisboundtobeinseparablefromeconomicbehavior.Analysis.Moreover,thisanalysisisnotsimplyajudgmentontherelationshipbetweeneconomicbehaviors,andoftenrequirestheuseofprofessionaleconomicsknowledge.Thisraisesthethresholdofanti-monopolylitigation,makingthetrialofanti-monopolycasesnotatthediscretionofanyjudge.Towin,professionaljudgesareneeded.
Secondly,theeconomicsofinstitutionalsetup.Thetermeconomymeanstoinvesttheleastinpeopleandproperty,toobtainthegreatestoutput,thatis,tomaximizetheutility.Itistruethattheprojectishandledexclusively.Itmaybethehighestguaranteeofjustice,thatis,itmayalsocausehugewaste.ThereisnoneedtosetupspecialcourtsforlitigationthatcanberesolvedwithinChina'sexistingjudicialframework.Ithinkthisisalsobecauseofjudicialequality.Judicialequalityisnotonlyequaltoeveryone.,Italsoliesintheequalityofcases.Thesameeconomiclawlitigationshouldreceivethesametreatment.
2.Theprincipleofhighstartingpoint
Theprincipleofhighstartingpointreferstothetrialofantitrustcases.Fromthebeginningofthefirstinstance,thehigher-rankingcourtsshouldberesponsible.Becauseanti-monopolylitigationinvolvestheuseofeconomicknowledgetoanalyzeeconomicbehaviorandimposesspecialprofessionalrequirementsonjudges.Therefore,thereshouldbefewerjudgeshearinganti-monopolycases.Andspecialized.Amongthem,less,isconducivetoensuringtheunificationofjustice;specialized,itcanimprovetheleveloftrial.Asmallbutspecializedjudgeteamismoreconvenientforfuturetrainingandre-learning,maintainingprofessionalism.HowtoensurethatfewbutspecializedjudgesensureefficienthandlingofoppositionMonopolycases?Therecanbenocasesandnocasescanbehandledandnocasescanbehandled.Forthisreason,theauthorbelievesthatitisnecessarytoexpandthegeographicalscopeofjudges'responsibilitysothatthisgroupofjudgescanbedistributedinhigh-leveltrialorganizations.InChina,theIntermediatePeople’sCourtshouldbethestartingpoint.
3.Theprincipleofpublicwelfare
Thepersonwhoimplementsthesystemmustnotonlyknowwhatishappening,butalsoknowwhy,inordertoletthesystemplayThegreatestutility.
Inantitrustlitigation,thisistheprincipleofpublicinterest.Theprincipleofpublicinterestistoantitrustlaw,justastheprincipleofgoodfaithistocivillaw,itshouldrunthroughthetheoreticaldiscussionofantitrustlitigation.Fromthebeginningtopractice,itisimplementedliketheruleofkings.Itnotonlydeclaresthevalueoftheanti-monopolylaw,butalsoovercomesthelimitationsofthestatutorylaw.Inreality,thereisnoperfectlegislation,nottomentionthatChina'santi-monopolylawisjustgettingstarted,anditisinthefaceofthelaw.Whenomissionsaremade,theprincipleofpublicwelfareistheNüwastonetofillintheomissions;inthecaseofjudges’discretion,itisascaleforweighingjustice.
Second,China’soppositionJurisdictionofmonopolylitigation
1.Chinashouldtryanti-monopolycasesintheexistingjudicialsystem
Withregardtothejurisdictionofanti-monopolylitigationinChina,thefirstthingtoberesolvediswhetheritneedstoestablishSpecializedanti-monopolylitigationcourtsstillselectsomecourtsfromtheexistingcourtsystemtoberesponsibleforhearinganti-monopolycases.Inthisregard,theauthorbelievesthatChinadoesnotneedtoestablishaspecialanti-monopolylitigationcourt,butshouldselectsomecourtsfromtheexistingcourtsystemtoberesponsibleforhearinganti-monopolycases.Thegreatestadvantageofsettingupspecialcourtsisthatspecialcasesarehandledexclusively,judgesarehighlyspecialized,andtheuniformityofjudicialprocessingisrelativelyguaranteed.Thedisadvantageisthatitrequiresalotofmanpower,materialresourcesandfinancialresourcestomatch,andthedemandforjudicialresourcesisrelativelyhigh.TakealookatthevariousspecializedcourtsestablishedinChina—specialcourtsformilitary,railway,andmaritimeaffairs,etc.,eithermayinvolvemilitarysecretsorhaveahighdegreeofindustrycharacteristicsinhandling.Althoughantitrustcasesareeconomicallyprofessional,theyarestillonetypeofeconomiccases.Judgingfromtheexistingcases,China’sexistingcourtsystemisfullycapableofadjudicatinganti-monopolycases.Therefore,Chinadoesnotneedtoestablishaspecialanti-monopolylitigationcourt.Itisalsopossibletohearanti-monopolylitigationintheexistingcourtsystem.ThemosteconomicalwayofChina'sjudicialresources.
2.LeveljurisdictionofChina'santi-monopolylitigation
Whichlevelofcourtisselectedtoberesponsibleforhearinganti-monopolycasesshouldbeconsideredintermsofleveljurisdictionandgeographicaljurisdiction.Fromtheaboveanalysisandcomparison,weknowthatthemajorityofcountriesintheworldthathaveimplementedanti-monopolylegalsystemsbasicallychoosemiddle-levelcourtsintheirnationalcourtsystemfortheiranti-monopolylitigation.Thatis,ajudicialorgansimilartoChina'sIntermediatePeople'sCourtisresponsibleforthefirstinstanceofanti-monopolycases.Thereasonforthisisobviouslybasedontheprofessionalismofantitrustlitigationandtheaccompanyingdifficultyoftrial.Generallyspeaking,thehigherthelevelofthecourt,thehigherthelevelofjudgesandthestrongertheabilitytoconductbusinessresearch,whichcangivehigherqualityassuranceinantitrustcases.Atthesametime,anti-monopolycasesoftenhavearelativelywiderangeofinfluence,beyondthescopeofthejurisdictionofabasiccourt.Thejurisdictionofanintermediatecourtismorelikelytoensuretheunityoftheoutcomeofthecase.Infact,injudicialpractice,basedonthesameconsiderations,ChinahasalreadyhandedoveraconsiderablepartofthefirstinstancetotheIntermediatePeople'sCourt,suchaspatentcasesandforeign-relatedcases.Thesecondinstancebroughtagainstthefirst-instancejudgmentshallbeacceptedbythehigher-levelcourtoftheintermediatecourt,whichisconsistentwiththegeneralprovisionsoftheprocedurallaw.
InChina'scourtsystem,thenumberofintermediatepeople'scourtsisquitelarge.Doeseveryintermediatecourthavetherighttoacceptthefirstinstanceofantitrustcases?Theauthorholdsanegativeopinion.Ibelievethattheanti-monopolylawenforcementagenciesshouldbeusedtodeterminethecourtsinwhichanti-monopolycasesaresued.Inotherwords,onlytheintermediatecourtwheretheanti-monopolylawenforcementagencyanditsdispatchedagencyarelocatedhavetherighttoacceptthefirstinstanceofananti-monopolycase.Ofcourse,thepremiseisthattheestablishmentofanti-monopolylawenforcementagenciesshouldbeseparatedfromtheexistingadministrativedivisionsofprovincesandcities,andtheanti-monopolylawenforcementagenciesshouldbeestablishedunderalarge-scalesystem,andtheanti-monopolyagenciesshouldbesetupunderthem.Theauthorbelievesthatthenumberofcourtsinantitrustcasesshouldbelimited.Thisnumbershouldnotbetoosmall.ItisunrealisticandunreasonableinChinatoconcentrateallthecourtsinthecapital(theTokyoHighCourt)likeJapan(thispracticehasalsobeencriticizedinJapan).Butthenumbercannotbetoomuch,becausetheprofessionalnatureofantitrustcasesdeterminesthattheverdictofeveryantitrustcaseinthefuturewillbeusedasacaseforcarefulstudy.Operatorsusethistodeterminethe"high-voltageline"outsidetheirscopeofactivity,andothercourtsuseitasareferencefortheirownjudgments.Sincethejudgmentbearsthefunctionofamodelandatextbook,ahighdegreeofuniformitymustbeensured,anditisobviouslymucheasiertounifywithinacourtthanamongseveralcourts.Therefore,theauthorbelievesthatthenumberoflitigatedcourtsshouldbecontrolled.Oneofthereasonsisthattheanti-monopolylawenforcementagenciesdeterminethatthelitigatedcourtscanlimitthenumberoflitigatedcourtstoamoderatelevel.
Thesecondreasonistohelpprotecttheindependenceofthejudiciary.Judicialindependenceisnotaproblemfacedbyanti-monopolylitigationalone,butaprobleminChina'scurrentjudicialsystem.Beforethecurrentsituationinwhichhumanrightsandfinancialpowerareinthehandsofthegovernmentischanged,itisimpossiblefortrialstocompletelyavoidadministrativeinterference.However,wemuststrivetomaketrialsaslittleaspossible.Inthefieldofanti-monopolyinChina,administrativemonopolyisurgentlyneededtobesolved.Administrativemonopolyisalwaysbasedoncertainadministrativepower.Ifthecourtinquestionisstilldeterminedinaccordancewiththeexistingadministrativedivisionsofprovincesandcities,itisdifficulttoguaranteethatitwillnotbegreatlyaffectedbyadministrativepower.interference.Departingfromtheexistingadministrativedivisionstodeterminethecourtstobesuedshouldbemoreconducivetoguaranteeingjudicialindependence.Ofcourse,theestablishmentofanti-monopolylawenforcementagenciesaccordingtotheregionalsystemiscurrentlyonlyasuggestionofscholars.Iftheanti-monopolylawfinallypassedbytheNationalPeople'sCongressdoesnotadoptthissuggestion,andstipulatesthattheanti-monopolylawenforcementagenciesandtheirdispatchedagenciesshouldbeestablishedaccordingtotheexistingadministrativedivisions.Theauthorsuggeststhat,likepatentlitigation,anumberofintermediatepeople’scourtsshouldbedesignatedtohearallantitrustcaseswithinacertainarea.Thisisanotherwaytocontrolthenumberofcourtsindicted.
3.TerritorialjurisdictionofantitrustlitigationinChina
Leveljurisdictiondeterminesthesequenceofthelitigatedcourtsvertically,butitalsoneedstobebasedonthejurisdictionofeachcourtandthesubordinationofantitrustcasesRelationshiptodeterminegeographicjurisdiction.
Therearedifferentstandardsfordetermininggeographicaljurisdiction.Itcanbetheconnectionbetweenthelocationofthelitigant(especiallythedomicileofthedefendant)andthecourtjurisdiction,orthesubjectofthelawsuit,thesubjectmatterofthelawsuit,orthefactsofthecourt.Linksbetweencourtjurisdictions.Thesamecasemaymeetdifferentstandardsatthesametime.Atthistime,itshouldbedeterminedinconjunctionwiththeregionaljurisdictionstandardsstipulatedbythecivil,executive,andcriminalprocedurallaws.Specifically,administrativecasesshallbegovernedbytheplaintiff-to-defendantprinciple,andshallbeunderthejurisdictionofthecourtwheretheadministrativelawenforcementagencythatmadetheadministrativerulingislocated.Criminalcasesareunderthejurisdictionofthecourtwherethecrimewascommitted.Sinceanti-monopolycivillitigationisthereliefprovidedbytheanti-monopolylawtothepartiesbasedontheprinciplesoftortlawinthecivillaw,theauthorbelievesthatthecourtofacivilcaseshouldnotonlyincludethecourtwherethedefendantislocated,butalsothecourtwheretheinfringementhasoccurred(includingthecourtwheretheinfringementhasoccurred).Placeandtheplacewheretheinfringementresultoccurred).Theaboveisthejurisdictionofanti-monopolylitigationundernormalcircumstances.TheauthorbelievesthatChina'santi-monopolylawshouldalsoprovideforthetransferofjurisdictionsystematthesametime.ThetransferofjurisdictionsystemalreadyexistsintheChineselitigationsystem.Inordertofacilitatethetrialandensuretheunityofjudicialprecedents,China’santi-monopolylawshouldstipulatethatthereceivingcourtshallconsiderthedomicileorlocationoftheparties,theplacewherethelegalfactsinvolvedinthelitigationoccur,thelocationofwitnesses,orthecommonalityofevidenceAccordingtotheapplicationorexofficiofactors,allorpartofthelawsuitwillbetransferredtoothercourts.Suchtransfersshouldbereportedtothehighercourtsfortherecord,andproceedwithcaution.Whenamasscasearises,thehighercourtcanalsorulethatonecourtwilltryallthecases.
3.Thesubjectofanti-monopolylitigationinChina
Thesubjectoflitigationshouldbeaclassorgroupthatmeetscertainconditions,notjustasporadicindividual.ThetraditionaldualsocialclassdivisionmethodbetweenthepoliticalstateandindividualcitizensisnolongersuitableforChina’ssocialstatusquo.Assomescholarshavepointedout,Chinahasnowchangedfromapatternofintegrationofthestateandsocietytoaneraofcomplementaryinteractionsbetweenthestateandsociety.,Therehavebeenextremelydiverseinterestgroupsandsocialgroupsrepresentingtheirinterests.(GuoDaohui,2001)Therefore,nowandinthefuture,theternarydivisionofpoliticalstate,civilsociety,andindividualcitizensshouldbeamorescientifictheory.Accordingtothegeneraltheory,civilsocietyisaspecificcategorycorrespondingtothestate.Itreferstotheindependentactivitiesofindividualsandgroupsinaccordancewithnon-compulsoryprinciplesandcontractconceptstoachievematerialinterestsandsocialinteractionsthatarenotdirectlycontrolledbythestate.Autonomousorganizationsandunofficialandnon-privatepublicspheresarealsocalledcivilsocietyorcivilsociety.(HuoXinbin,2002)Toformabenigninteractivedemocraticsociety,thethreeclassesneedtocontaineachotherandachieveacertaindegreeofbalance.ThecurrentsituationinChinaistovigorouslydevelopandstrengthenthestrengthofcivilsocietysothatitcanplayitsduerole.Theauthorbelievesthataccordingtotheternarytheory,thesubjectsofanti-monopolylitigationinChinacanbedividedintothefollowingthreecategories:operatorsandconsumers,socialorganizations,andprocuratorialorgans.
1.Operatorsandconsumers
Inantitrustlitigation,theoperatormaybeeithertheplaintifforthedefendant,andthedefendantinmostantitrustlitigationistheoperator.AccordingtothedefinitionproposedinthedraftAnti-MonopolyLaw,operatorsrefertolegalpersons,otherorganizationsandnaturalpersonsengagedincommodityoperationsinaspecificmarket.Thereisfiercecompetitionamongoperators,andthemostdirecttargetofmonopolisticbehavioristheoperators.Therefore,thelitigationbetweenoperatorsisthemostbasicformofantitrustlitigation,andtheoperatorsarealsotheleastcontroversialantitrustlitigation.Mainbody.
Consumerswillnotbecomedefendantsinantitrustlawsuits.Whethertheyhavetherighttofileantitrustcivillawsuitsasplaintiffsisstillcontroversial.Thereisaviewthatconsumersarenotdirectlybenefitedbymonopolisticbehavior,butindirectlylostbybenefits,andthatthosewhohavelostindirectbenefitsshouldnothavetherighttosue.Inthisregard,theauthorbelievesthatconsumerscannotbegeneralizedthatconsumersmustbeindirectprofitlosers.Whenretailersimplementmonopolisticbehavior,consumersaredirectlyharmed.Thecompetitionconflictsbetweenconsumersandmonopolisticactorsexistobjectively,andconsumers'infringementbymonopolisticbehaviorsisalsoanobjectivephenomenon.Suchinfringementsonconsumerscannotberemediedthroughcurrentcivillawsuits.Becausethereliefoftraditionalcivillawmethodsispremisedonthedefendant’sbreachofcontractorillegality,andtheinfringementcausedbymonopolisticbehaviorskillfullybypassesthisstatutoryconditionandishiddenunderthelegaltradingrelationship,andthecivillawdoesnotprohibitmonopoly.Therefore,consumersshouldbegiventherighttofileanti-monopolylitigationandprotecttheirlegitimaterightsandinterestsinaccordancewiththeprovisionsoftheanti-monopolylaw.Anothereffectofgivingconsumerstherighttosueisthattheanti-monopolylawsuitsbroughtbyconsumerscanrestrainmonopolisticbehavior,therebyreducingthearbitrarinessofmonopolisticbehaviorwiththeself-defenseabilityofconsumers.Theresultofincreasedcostscausedbythepossibilityoflosingthelawsuitwillbetheresultofmonopolisticactors.Anunavoidableconcern.
Asthesubjectofanti-monopolylitigation,consumershavetodiscussanotherissue.Doconsumersneedtotakeanti-monopolylawsuitstodealwiththemfirst?Inotherwords,canconsumershavecomplete,Independentlitigationrights.Theauthorbelievesthattherightoflitigationgrantedtoconsumersshouldbeacompleteandindependentrightoflitigation,whichisnotrestrictedbytheanti-monopolylawenforcementagency'sfirsthandling.However,iftheanti-monopolylawenforcementagencyhasalreadymadearulingonthesameincident,therulingshouldbeabletobecitedbyconsumersasevidenceinlitigation.
2.Socialgroups
Letsocialgroupshavetherighttosueisamanifestationoftheroleofcivilsocietyasthemiddleclassofsociety.Whethercivilsocietyisanideaoranentityisstillcontroversial.Theconsensusisthatcivilsocietyisthemiddlegroundbetweenthepoliticalstateandcitizens,representingprivaterights,andthepurposeistoachieveprivateblessings.Themanifestationinanti-monopolylitigationisthecivillitigationrightsofsocialorganizations.Socialorganizations,alsoknownasnon-governmentalorganizations(NGOs),inaccordancewiththespiritofArticle71oftheCharteroftheUnitedNations,non-governmentalorganizationsshouldrefertoallorganizationsotherthangovernmentsthatengageinnon-profitactivitiesonaninternationalscale,includingcharitableorganizations,Aidorganizations,youthgroups,religiousorganizations,tradeunions,cooperativeassociations,businessoperators’associations,etc.Socialgroupsarefurtherdividedintomutuallybeneficialsocialgroupsandpublicwelfaresocialgroups.Allowingsocialgroupstofilelawsuitstosafeguardpublicinterestinaccordancewiththelawisinlinewithcontemporaryrightsdiversificationandsocializationtrends,andgroupsgenerallyappearingintheformofindustryassociationshaverelativelystrongeconomicandtechnicaladvantagesandcompletelitigationcapabilities.Betterclaimrights.Inthissense,anti-monopolypublicinterestlitigationshouldbeunderstoodasaproceduralsystemforthepublictoparticipateinthemanagementofmarketcompetitionorderandparticipateintheprocessofresolvingmonopolypublichazards,ratherthanjustasimplelitigationmethod.Inreality,operatorsandconsumersarepronetothefollowingproblemsinlitigation:first,scatteredoperatorsandconsumersrepeatlitigation,whichistime-consumingandlaboriousandmaycauseconflictsincourtjudgments;second,thedirectlyinjuredindividualsabandonthelitigationduetovariousreasons,causingsocietyThepublicinterestisdamagedandthereisnoremedy;third,thepowerofordinaryindividualplaintiffsisdifficulttocompetewithmonopolisticactors,andtheinferiorpositionoflitigationresourceswillleadtouncertaintyinprivatelitigation,andtraditionalcivillitigationonlyprovidesgeneralcompensatorycivilcompensation,whichisverylimited.Operatorsandconsumershandingovertherightoflitigationtosocialorganizationscansolvetheseproblems.Therefore,China'santi-monopolylawshouldgivesocialorganizationstherighttofileanti-monopolylitigationasplaintiffs.
Asanorganization,socialgroupscaneffectivelymobilizesocialresources,buttheydonothaveinherentjustice.Oncetheindustryofthesocialgroupisinfiercemarketcompetition,itiseasytotransformthenaturalcoordinationabilityintotheabilitytocollude,whichcanbeusedasatooltoimplementunfaircompetitionandmonopolisticbehaviors.Implementationisharmfultocompetitors,customers,andconsumers.Aswellasthebehaviorsofweakandsmallenterpriseswithinthegroup,andbecauseoftheunificationoftheorganizationofsocialgroups,comparedwiththegeneralunlawfulcompetitionbehavior,theimplementationofsocialdecisionsismoreefficientandtheharmtosocietyisgreater.Thespecialpersonalityofsocialorganizationsdeterminesthattheywillinevitablybecometheobjectofregulationbythecompetitionlaw.Taketheindustryassociationasanexample.Althoughtheindustryassociationisanon-profitpublicwelfarelawthatoperatesinaprivatemanner,becausetheindustryassociationisanorganizationcomposedofcompaniesinthesameindustryforthepurposeofpursuingprofit,intheincreasinglyfiercemarketcompetition,Industryassociationsareoftenusedasanaturalforumforcompaniestoconductanti-competitivebehaviors.Forexample,theimplementationofanti-competitivebehaviorssuchasuniformpricing,quantityrestriction,marketdivision,andinformationexchangeamongmembersoftheassociation;urgingmemberstoengageininappropriatetransactionbehaviorssuchasrefusaloftransactions,differentialtreatment,anddiscriminatorytransactions;Anti-competitivebehaviorssuchastheentryofcompetitorsintotheirexistingmarkets.Therefore,socialorganizationsshouldberegulatedbytheanti-monopolylawandrestricttheiractivitieswithintheproperscope.
3.Procuratorate
AccordingtoChina’s"CriminalProcedureLaw",thepowerofcriminalprosecutioninChinaisexclusivelyforprocuratorialorgans,andthereisnoexceptioninthefieldofanti-monopolylaw.Whatneedstobediscussedhereisitsstartup.Isitnecessarytogivetheanti-monopolylawenforcementagencyexclusivewhistle-blowingpowerlikeJapan?Theauthorbelievesthattheanti-monopolylawenforcementagencyshouldberesponsibleforreportingmonopolycrimesinChina'santi-monopolylaw,butthereareexceptions.Accordingtothecurrentdesign,theChineseanti-monopolylawenforcementagencyhastheresponsibilityofmonitoringthemarkettomaintainakeensenseofmonopolisticbehavior.Whenamonopolisticbehaviorisfoundandthedegreeofviolationisdeemedtoconstituteacrime,thecaseshallbereportedtotheprocuratorialorgan,andthecaseshallbefiled,investigated,andprosecutedbytheprocuratorialorgan.Inordertodeterminewhethertheillegalityofthemonopolybehaviorisseriousenoughtoconstituteacrime,theanti-monopolylawenforcementagencyneedstoinvestigateandcollectevidence.Inthisprocess,uponrequest,thepublicsecurityagencyshallprovideassistance.Anothersourceofinformationforanti-monopolylawenforcementagenciesistoreport,especiallywhenthemonopolybehaviorisrelativelyconcealedonthesurface.Thewhistleblowershouldreporttotheanti-monopolylawenforcementagencyandrequesttheanti-monopolylawenforcementagencytoreporttotheprocuratorialorgan.Iftheanti-monopolylawenforcementagencyrefusestoreport,thepartyconcernedcandirectlyreporttotheprocuratorialagency.
Inordertoencourageinsiders,especiallyinsiderparticipants,toreportmonopolisticbehavior,itshouldbestipulatedthatthereportofmonopolisticbehaviorparticipantsisanactofsurrender,andthepunishmentmaybelighterormitigatedasappropriate.Inaddition,ifthecourtconsidersthatthemonopolisticactconstitutesacrimeduringthetrialofananti-monopolycivilcase,itshalltransfertherelevantmaterialstotheprocuratorateforreviewandfiling,andthetrialoftheoriginalcivilcaseshallbesuspended,andajudgmentshallbemadeafterthecriminaltreatment.
Inadditiontoinitiatingcriminalanti-monopolylawsuits,procuratorialorgansshouldalsohavetherighttofileanti-monopolycivillawsuitsonthegroundsthattheanti-monopolylitigationisofpublicinterest.Itcanbesaidthattheconfermentoflitigationrightsinanti-monopolylitigationislargelyfortheneedtosafeguardpublicinterests.Wheretheinfringementismoredangerousandhasawiderangeofinfluences,buthasnotbeenspecificallyprojectedtoaspecificperson,thesubjectscopeoftherightoflitigationmustbeexpandedinordertoprotectthepublicinterestorlegalinterest.Ifpublicwelfareandprivateinterestscoexist,thelawnotonlyprotectsthepublicwelfare,butalsoprotectsrelatedprivateinterests(especiallytraffic,environmentalprotection,healthandsafetyregulations).Atthistime,whilegrantingtheprivaterightoflitigation,italsograntsthe"publicinterestdefender".Maintaintherightoflitigationforthepurposeofpublicwelfare.(rrWei,ShaoMing,ChenGang,2001)Prosecutorsshouldplaymultiplerolesinanti-monopolycivillitigation.
Thefirstroleoftheprocuratorialagencyinanti-monopolycivillitigationshouldbetherepresentativeofthepoliticalstate.Apoliticalcountryneedstoparticipateinacertainrangeofcivilactivitiesinordertomaintainthenormaloperationandfunctionofitsinstitutions.Inamarketeconomy,itmayalsobeviolatedbymonopolisticbehavior.Themosttypicalexampleiswhenthecountryconductsgovernmentprocurement,thenationalinterestissubjecttoafixedprice.Damagetotheagreement.Thestatecannotdirectlysue,sotheprotectionofnationalinterestsrequiresarepresentativebody.Whattheprocuratorialorganprosecuteshereistoprotecttheinterestsofthemainbodyofthepoliticalstate,anddoesnotinvolvethemanagementfunctionofthestate.
Thethirdroleofprocuratorialorgansinantitrustcivillitigationistosupporttheprosecutionofvulnerablegroups.Thisrolehasbeenclarifiedintheexistinglawsandregulations.Inthefieldofanti-monopoly,itisstillnecessarytoemphasizethestate'spolicypreferencefordisadvantagedgroupstoreflectthesupremacyoffairvalue.Inordertosavejudicialresources,supportforprosecutionshouldberoughratherthandetailed,andtheprocuratorialorganshouldonlyappearontheplaintiff'sbenchinthethirdrolewhennecessary.Otherwise,itwillnotonlybeunfairtothedefendant,butwillalsotoleratetheplaintiff'sinertia.Moreover,inthelattertwotypesoflitigation,theprocuratorialorganhasthenatureofbeingaplaintiff,andonlywhenotherlitigationsubjectscannotprotecttheinterests,theprocuratorialorganfillsinthevacancies,sothatthelegalnetisrestored,withoutomission.
Inaddition,inordertopreventprocuratorialorgansfromfailingtoperformtheirduties,somescholarshaveputforwardthefollowingsuggestions,stipulatingthatspecialagenciesestablishedintheprocuratorateorsocialorganizationsauthorizedbylawactasrepresentativesofpublicinterestlitigationinChina,andthosewhohaveinterestsinthecaseCitizens,legalpersons,etc.canrequesttheprocuratoratetoinitiateapublicinterestlawsuit.Iftheprocuratoraterefusestoprosecute,thecitizenorlegalpersoncansueinthenameofpublicinterest.
Four.FormsofLiabilityforAnti-monopolyLitigationinChina
1.CivilLiabilityforAnti-monopolyLitigationinChina
CivilLiabilityapplicabletoanti-monopolylawinvariouscountriesincludesStopinfringementandcompensationfordamages.Chinashouldalsoprovideforthesetwotypesofcivilliability.Stopinfringementappliestocaseswheremonopolisticbehaviororitsthreatisstillongoing.Compensationfordamagescannotonlybeusedinconjunctionwiththesuspensionoftheinfringement,butalsocanbeseparatelyappliedtothesituationwherethemonopolyhasceasedandthereareonlyclaimsforcompensationforlosses.Theprincipleofliabilityshallapplytheprincipleofno-faultliability.Becausemonopolisticbehavioristheconsciousandactivebehavioroftheactorwhenitfirstappearsintheformofeconomicbehavior,itismeaninglesstoproveitssubjectiveintentionalityatthelevelofanti-monopoly.
Inthefieldofcivillaw,civilliabilityiscompensatory,thatis,forthepurposeofcompensatingforthelossescausedbyillegalacts.Inthefieldofanti-monopolylaw,duetothepublicwelfarenatureoftheanti-monopolylaw,shouldthecivilliabilityofanti-monopolylitigationbegivenafurtherfunction?ThispointofviewraisesthequestionofwhetherpunitivedamagesshouldbestipulatedintheChineseanti-monopolylawsystem.
Punitivedamagesmeansthatwhentheinfringerperformstheactmaliciouslyorhasgrossnegligenceintheact,thecourtisorderingtheperpetratortopayUsually,atthesametimeascompensation,theperpetratorcanalsobeorderedtopaycompensationthatishigherthantheactuallossofthevictim.(XuNanxuan,ChenNaixin,2004)ThepunitivedamagessystemfirstappearedintheUnitedKingdomandtheUnitedStates,anditisbelievedtohavethefollowingpurposesandfunctions:1.Weakentheeconomicfoundationoftheinfringer,preventthemfromdoingevilagain,andpreventotherpeopleinthesocietyfromimitatingthebehavioroftheinfringer;2.Encouragevictimstofilelawsuitsagainstunlawfulinfringers,andstimulatetheirenthusiasmtofightillegalacts;3.Compensationforemotionaldamagestothespiritoftheplaintiff(victim)sufferedinfringement.(LiuRongjun,1996)Lookingattheanti-monopolylawsofvariouscountries,onlytheUnitedStatescurrentlyprovidesforthetripledamagecompensationsystem.TheTaiwanAnti-monopolyLawprovidesfortheonetothreetimesdamagecompensationsystemdeterminedbyjudgesinspecificcases.Thecountrieswiththecompensationsystemallsetsingle-timecompensationliability,whichmeanscompensation.
Onthisissue,theauthoragreeswiththeviewofstipulatingadoubledamagecompensationsystem.Firstofall,thedoubledamagecompensationsystemisalreadyarealisticchoiceinChina’slegislation.The“ConsumerRightsProtectionLaw”inChina’scurrentlawprovidesforthedoubledamagecompensationsystemforfraudulentactivitiesbybusinessoperators.Practicehasprovedthatthisprovisionisrelativelysuccessful.ItspracticalresultscanbeusedforreferenceinChina'sfutureanti-monopolylaw'schoiceofdamagecompensationsystem.Secondly,thedoubledamagecompensationsystemismostsuitableforthelegislationandimplementationenvironmentofChina'santi-monopolylaw,becausethedoubledamagecompensationwillrelyonitsmoderatelitigationattraction,effectivelyensuringthatthenumberofanti-monopolylawcasesisonamoderatescale.(LiGuohai,2005)Inordertoachievethegoalofmoderation,itnotonlygivesprivateindividualsamoderateincentivetoprosecuteanddefendtheirrights,butnotsohighastocausetheconsequencesofabusivelitigation.
2.CriminalLiabilityinChina’sAnti-monopolyLitigation
AsfortheissueofwhetherChina’santi-monopolylitigationrequirescriminalliability,somescholarshavesuggestedthatChinashouldvigorouslydevelopeconomiesofscaleatthisstage,soitisnotappropriateSeverecriminalsanctionsareimposedonmonopolisticbehavior.Buttheauthorinsiststhatonlybymaintainingeffectivemarketcompetitioncantheeconomydevelophealthily.Theanti-monopolylawappliestoalleconomicentitiesparticipatinginChina'smarketeconomy,notjustnationalindustries.Ifyouonlylookatthesmallenvironmentofthenationalindustrywithoutconsideringtheoverallmarketenvironment,anddesignalawthatappliestothewholemarketbasedonthestatusquoofthenationalindustry,itwillonlycauseothereconomicentitiestofree-rideandacceleratedevelopment,andthenationalindustrywillultimatelygetnothing.Theevilconsequencesofthebenefits.Ifitissaidthatforthepurposeofindustrialpolicy,itisnecessarytogiveopportunitiesandtimetothenation’seconomicgrowth,thenitispossibletoslightlyrelaxthecriteriafordeterminingcriminalliabilityatthebeginningandgraduallyincreaseitinthefuture,insteadofcompletelydenyingitandcompletelyabolishingcriminalliability.Sanctions.
ThecriminalliabilityformofChina'santi-monopolylitigationshouldincludebothimprisonmentandfine.Thatis,imprisonmentorfinesareimposedonindividuals,andbothareusedwhennecessary.Afineisimposedonthecompany,andadoublepenaltysystemshouldbeimplementedwhenthecompanyimplementsmonopolisticbehavior.Theseverityofpenaltiesshoulddependonthetendencyofdomesticindustrialpoliciesandtheneedsoftheoveralleconomicenvironment,andthecoordinationoftheentirepenalsystemandcoordinationwiththeseverityofpenaltiesforothereconomiccrimesshouldbeconsidered.
V.Enforcementofanti-monopolylitigationinChina
Theenforcementofanti-monopolylitigationinChinashouldbetreatedindifferentformsofliability.Theenforcementofcriminalresponsibilitycandirectlyapplytheprovisionsofthecurrentcriminallawandcriminalprocedurelaw,imprisonmentandfines.TheenforcementofcivilliabilityshouldandcandirectlyapplytheprovisionsoftheCivilProcedureLaw.Regardingadministrativelitigationjudgmentsmadebyjudicialreviewofadministrativerulings,theauthorproposestointroduceananti-monopolylawenforcementagencyconsultationmechanismintheimplementation.Iftherulingmadebytheanti-monopolyenforcementagencyisupheldbytheruling,thentheexecutionoftherulingisactuallytheexecutionoftheruling.Inviewofthefactthattheenforcementofantitrustjudgmentsmayaffectthesurvivaloftheenterpriseoreventhechangeofmarketstructure,especiallyinthechangeofmarketstructure,thedetailedexecutionmustbeoperatedbyprofessionals.Asthemostprofessionalanti-monopolylawenforcementagency,theanti-monopolylawenforcementagencyshouldgiveitanopportunitytoexpressitsopinions,assistthecourtinitsenforcementwork,andimplementitsoriginalintentionofmakingadministrativerulingstotheend.Duringtheimplementation,agoodcoordinationandcooperationrelationshipshouldbeestablishedbetweenthetwopartiestoworktogethertoimplementtheanti-monopolylaw.